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REISSUED PATENTS AND INTERVENING RIGHTS
WILLIS B. RICEt.AND WILLIAM L. GROSSMANtt
EvERY business man in seeking to avoid suits for infringement of patent
rights will, if he is well advised, ask his attorney whether any dominant
patents exist which might interfere with his proposed course of conduct.
In all fairness he should be able to demand an answer that is reason-
ably conclusive, but under the present system no such reply can be
given.
One of the important factors which preclude a definite answer is
that an existing patent which his proposed operations do not infringe
may under some circumstances be reissued, after operations have been
begun, to contain claims which would make the continuance of those
operations apparently illegal. The attorney may study the claims that
the inventor now makes, but nothing short of divine wisdom can tell
what invention he may claim by reissue in the future. Accordingly,
the attorney hesitates to advise the business man to proceed; for at any
moment a reissue may swoop down and bring with it a suit for injunction.
No reissued patent can validly cover anything other than the original
invention.' It might at first sight appear easy, therefore, for the attor-
ney to examine any original patent, determine what the invention is,
and then decide whether his client's proposed operations involve the
use of that invention. But the matter is not so simple. Every inventor
must necessarily include within his patent a great many things which
he did not invent, in order to clarify the background and operation of
his invention. It may be difficult for the reader to determine to what
extent these are included directly or by inference in the wording of the
grant. It was to avoid this very ambiguity that the Supreme Court, in
the first important patent case to come before it,2 declared that unless
the inventor expressly stated in his patent the limits of his monopoly,
so that the public could have a warning of what it might do without
infringement, the patent would be void. But, if it is difficult for an
inventor accurately to draft a claim which properly delimits his inven-
tion, it is still more difficult for another to search out in a patent the
precise limits of that invention.
tMember of the New York Bar; formerly of the United States Patent Office; lecturer
on Patent Law, New York University School of Law.
ttMember of the New York Bar.
1. Note 8, infra.
2. Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356 (U. S. 1822).
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The definition of "invention" has caused no end of trouble. Much
has been said about the distinction between the idea of an invention
and the invention itself, suggesting that the idea is nebulous and value-
less whereas the invention is physical, concrete, and therefore signifi-
cant. It is true that, except in the class of inventions called processes,
the inventor generally constructs a device to embody the idea, but he
may equally well file an application for patent before any device has
been built. From the legal point of view, it makes little difference which
course he takes. The inventor's contribution is not the physical device,
for that is merely a mechanical working out 6f his idea; it is rather the
inspiring concept which makes it possible to build the physical device.3
In the strictest sense the reduction of the idea (invention) to practice
is not so much a completion of the invention as a demonstration of its
practicability. Without the possibility of the latter, however, there
is no patentable invention (and therefore no "invention" in the legal
sense), for the idea alone contains no solution to a problem.
New ideas, although not divisible in the same sense in which a plot
of land is' divisible, have the special relation of greater and smaller.
The idea of a device X made of a particular metal Y, for example, is
less general than the idea of the device X made of a metal of any kind
whatsoever. The former is ordinarily referred to as a more specific idea.
It does not follow from the fact that the patentee invented the former
that he also invented the latter idea. In fact, very frequently he did
not. In such a case the realization that other metals could be em-
ployed is a distinctly new and separate invention.
The distinct and separate character of these two ideas is indicated
by the fact that frequently the concept of making the device of metal
was long known before the specific idea of using the metal Y was con-
ceived, or, that of two inventors, one conceived the idea of making the
device X of metal and the other, knowing of this, conceived of using
the metal Y. In such case, if it be assumed that a real invention was
involved, it is clear that each of these inventors is entitled to a separate
patent. The one patentee cannot specifically claim use of the metal Y
because he never thought of it, and the other patentee is not entitled
to the broad idea of making the device of metal because that idea is the
contribution of another inventor.
The broad idea, then, is not an inherent part of the specific. They
constitute separate inventions. The patenting of one of these is no
evidence that the patentee is entitled to the other. If the inventor is
permitted to reissue from the narrow concept to the broad, with no sup-
3. Blandy v. Griffith, Fed. Cas. No. 1529 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1869).
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porting evidence from the original patent that he is the inventor of the
broad, he is permitted to reissue his patent for a different invention,
contrary to the statute.
Such reissues, clearly unwarranted, might be disposed of in every case
as covering an invention presumably not invented by the patentee, with-
out the necessity of a more specific defense. For to justify a reissue, it
must be clear from the original patent that the patentee invented the
new subject-matter.4 In the described case the broad idea is just as
clearly a new idea so far as the original patent is concerned; it is just
as surely "new matter" (expressly prohibited by the statute),G as an
alternative construction would be if introduced for the first time in the
reissue. In fact it is the suggestion of a great many alternative con-
structions and a claiming of them all.
More perplexing are reissues which expand the concept in one respect
but disguise the expansion by placing an additional limitation upon the
concept in another respect. For example, after patenting the idea of
device X made of metal Y the patentee may seek to claim by reissue the
idea of device X made of metal Y or Z and run by electric motor.
The electric motor narrows the concept; for now only devices run by
an electric motor are included, whereas formerly the devices might
have been run by any means whatsoever. Yet the change to "made of
metal Y or Z" is nevertheless a broadening, just as it was in the pre-
vious case. Possibly the limitation may be more significant than the
broadening (although the reverse is more often the case, for the limita-
tion is usually trivial and may be made simply to mislead Patent Office
and court); but to call the reissue narrowed in a case involving the use
of metal Z is to turn one's back on the fact that at least in the feature
relevant to the case the conception of the invention has been broadened.
Two great and obvious evils arise from the granting of broadened
reissues: (1) the temptation to an inventor to claim in a reissue some-
thing akin to his invention, but which he did not really invent, and (2)
the injustice to persons who, prior to the grant of the reissue, began a
course of conduct which they would not have begun had they known of
the impending reissue, and who are obliged to suffer pecuniary loss
through a discontinuance of that course of conduct.'
Although the evils and abuses involved in the granting and enforce-
4. Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87 (1887); Penn Electric Switch
Co. v. Luthe Hardware Co., 63 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
5. Note 8, infra.
6. Rephrasing the first of the two evils in terms of injustice, we may say that it con-
sists in the injustice to the public which results from its being obliged to pay tribute to
an inventor for something he did not invent.
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ment of reissued patents are more pronounced in broadened reissues,
even reissues which do not strictly fall within that class may involve
similar unhappy consequences. This is illustrated by the case of a
reissue which makes claims narrower than they were in the original
and so safeguards an invention which was not formerly effectively pro-
tected. The original patent, on file before the grant of the reissue, pur-
ports to cover an "invention" broadly. Within the bounds of that
"broader" invention are a number-often a very great number--of spe-
cific embodiments which the patentee might have patented; that is, apart
from any question of the validity of the possible reissues, there are a
number of included "inventions" which the patentee, so far as the search-
ing attorney knows, may seek to protect by reissue. Must the attorney,
perhaps aware of the invalidity of every claim of the patent, neverthe-
less by some feat of clairvoyance hazard a conclusion as to which of the
possible specific but unclaimed inventions happened to be in the patentee's
mind? Or must he by dint of an extended and laborious search (re-
quiring of course, a proportionate bill for services) try to discover
just which inventions, in the mass of possible inventions included in
the broad claim, are in truth patentable and advise his eager client
to keep hands off?
The same dilemma presents itself in the case of a vague claim. No
one can tell just what the patentee meant to patent; and if his right to
obtain and to enforce a reissue be rigidly maintained, he will in effect
be protected during the interval as to any patentable device-and, prob-
ably, in view of the exigencies of the situation, as to any other devices
not obviously unpatentable-which might conceivably be suggested by
the vague claim, for, not knowing which the patentee meant to claim,
the interested party must avoid them all. Moreover, there is in these
cases a grave danger, although not so great as in cases of broadened
reissues, that the inventor did not really invent what he claims in his
reissue. As lawyer Webster, over a hundred years ago, said in this
connection, "If he swears it, who can deny it?"'
Courts might have interpreted the reissue statute8 in such a way
that broadened reissues would have been impossible. It clearly invites
such an interpretation in providing that a reissue may be granted only
if the original patent "is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by rea-
son of a defective or insufficient specification, or by reason of the patentee
claiming as his own invention or discovery more than he had a right
to claim as new . . ."I This part of the statute, except for the words
7. Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 231 (U. S. 1832).




"wholly or partly," has not been altered appreciably since 1836. The
italicized words above expressly permit narrowed reissues; but there is
no corresponding clause to permit broadened reissues. In view of the
fact that broadened reissues are more extreme in character than nar-
rowed reissues, it is probable that the legislature, if it had intended to
permit broadened reissues, would have expressly said so.
THE HISTORY OF BROADENED REISSUES
Early History: Period of the Inventor's Supremacy
The original patent statutes made no provision for the reissue of a
patent. But the granting of patents was placed in the hands of one
Dr. Thornton,"0 who seems to have been rather a law unto himself;
and some time before 1824 he adopted, on his own responsibility, the
practice of accepting the surrender of patents and issuing new ones,
sometimes without further fee. The policy of reissuing patents was
first passed upon by the Supreme Court in 183211 in considering a
patent for a hat-making machine issued to Joseph Grant in 1821 and
reissued in 1825. Apparently the patent had previously come before a
Connecticut court, but the decision does not seem to be reported. The
instant case arose in New York, and the lower court's opinion contains
the following eulogy of the invention:
"This machine is one of wonderful ingenuity, and has been of vast advantage
to the public; and it is gratifying to learn, that its worthy and indefatigable
inventor has been thus far successful in the recovery of exemplary damages
for the violation of his just rights."'
2
The reason for asking for a reissue of the Grant patent does not ap-
pear. Even after the reissue, some of the grounds of defense were that
the patent was too vague and lacking in specific instruction, that it was
for a principle which is not patentable and not for a machine, and that
there had been prior public use. Whatever the ostensible ground of
reissue, however, Mr. Webster's argument before the Supreme Court
is illuminating:
10. Dr. Thornton was Superintendent of the Patent Office and, because of the small
number of applications for patents, was able to give personal attention to every applica-
tion. In 1816 and for a decade thereafter, there were only two other persons in the Patent
Office, William Elliot, clerk, and Benjamin (later replaced by Robert W.) Fenwick, mes-
senger. Their combined salaries in 1816 amounted to $1,972. A REGIsTER or OFFICERS
AND AGENTS, CIVh, MILITARY, AND NAVAL, IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNaTED STATES (1816)
5, and subsequent issues of the same publication.
11. Grant v. Raymond, supra note 7.
12. Grant & Townsend v. - , Fed. Cas. No. 5701, at 985 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1829).
[Vol. 43
REISSUED PATENTS
"A man builds an expensive factory, puts 'in costly machinery, not patented,
not described in any specification; he expends much money; by and by, he
is sued for violating a patent, and he finds that since he built, an old patent
has come out with a new specification. A hearing, of which he knew nothing,
has been had before the secretary, and a new patent has issued, and he is
called on to stop his factory. Now this supposed case is the very case before
the court. The defendants erected their works ihi 1823, 1824. They knew of
the plaintiff's patent of August 11, 1821, but it did not describe any machinery
used by them. But in 1825 he surrendered his first patent, took out another,
with a specification describing their machinery, and sued them. Under the
direction of the court he has recovered a verdict of three thousand two hun-
dred and sixty-six dollars; and is entitled, of course, to have this trebled
and the defendants are ruined. Is this legal?" 3  .
But the Court, apparently lost in the same admiration for the inventor
that characterized the lower court's opinion, swept aside this suggestion
for a defense of intervening rights arising from acts performed by the
defendant prior to the grant of the reissue. In the glib words of Chief
Justice Marshall,
"It is not probable that the defect in the specification can be so apparent as to
be perceived by any but those who examine it for the purpose of pirating the
invention.'
14
If a purpose of the specification is, as the Supreme Court had said,
"to put the public in possession of what the party [patentee] claims
as his own invention, so as to . . . guard against prejudice or injury
from the use of an invention which the [third] party may otherwise
innocently suppose not to be patented,"'5 it is difficult to see a proper
basis for the Court's righteous indignation when a party came before
it who had accepted the principle of the Supreme Court, who had taken
13. Grant v. Raymond, sup,4a note 7, at 230.
The wrong to persons who innocently used an invention before the original patent of
that invention, arising from the enforcement of the subsequently granted patent rights--
a situation analogous to that of intervening rights-had been recognized by a court in
what is probably the first recorded utterance pertinent to the subject. In 1824, speaking
of persons who started to manufacture before the grant of the patent, a Circuit Court had
said: "But I am inclined to think . . . a patent should not be permitted to operate
to the prejudice of persons thus situated, on the principle that innocent third persons
are not to be injured by relation back, so as to deprive them of a right lawfully acquired.
And if a person knowing of an invention proceeds to put it in use, the inventor not hav-
ing secured his right by patent, the latter ought not to be permitted to take away that
which was previously lawfully made. No man is to be permitted to lie by for years,
and then take out a patent." Morris v. Huntington, Fed. Cas. No. 9831, at 820 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1824).
14. Supra note 7, at 243.
15. Evans v. Eaton, supra note 2, at 434. (italics and parenthetical insertions added).
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the patentee at his word, who had examined the original patent to see
what the patentee claimed, and who had acted on the information so
obtained.
The argument of the plaintiff in the Grant case, accepted-one is
tempted to say, swallowed-by the Court, is that: "The public yields
nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has
contracted to receive."' 6  In neither statement is the Court correct.
The public did not receive from the original patent the exact and specific
instruction needed to put the invention to practical use, and it did not
receive that exact statement of the limits of the monopoly which would
enable other inventors and manufacturers to proceed with safety-and
these, it will be noted, are the only two things the public is intended
to receive. The patentee, on the other hand, got from his original patent
the full monopoly which he had asked for, insofar as the public had
agreed to grant it. If the monopoly was too limited to suit his desires,
it was solely because his own contribution to the public was correspond-
ingly limited and required the efforts and contributions of others to
make it commensurate with the invention which he sought to monopolize
by reissue.
Grant v. Raymond was decided in the January term of the Court.
On the third of July in the same year, Congress passed the first reissue
statute and included a provision hostile to a defense of intervening
rights."T This was supplanted in the Patent Act of 1836 by the following
provision, which has undergone only minor changes down to the pres-
ent day:
"And the patent, so reissued, together with the corrected description and speci-
fication, shall have the same effect and operation in law, on the trial of all
actions hereafter commenced for causes subsequently accruing, as though the
same had been originally filed in such corrected form, before the issuing out
of the original patent.""
Clearly, if the reissued patent has the same effect as though it had been
filed at the time the original was filed, no acts by persons other than
the patentee, if performed after that date, can serve as a defense. Con-
gress seems to have deliberately endeavored to perpetuate the worst
features of the Grant case, and at the same time preclude the only safe-
16. Supra note 7, at 242.
17. "But no public use or privilege of the invention so patented, derived from or
after the grant of the original patent, either under any special license of the inventor,
or without the consent of the patentee that there shall be a free public use thereof, shall, in
any manner, prejudice his right of recovery for any use or violation of his invention after
the grant of such new patent as aforesaid." 4 STAT. 559 (1832).
18. 5 STAT. 117, 122 (1836); now 16 STAT. 205 (1870), 35 U. S. C. § 64 (1926).
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guard suggested by the Court, namely, the defense of intervening rights.
In Stimpson v. The West Chester Railroad Co.,'9 Stimpson's patent,
coming before the Court in 1846, had been originally issued in 1831
and reissued in 1835. In 1843, the Railroad had used, in the con-
struction of its tracks and engine-wheels, the invention subsequently
claimed in the reissue. It was impossible to determine the exact differ-
ences between the reissue and the original patent, for the latter had
been burned in the Patent Office fire of 1836. Its scope, therefore, had
to be determined by oral testimony. The invention was an idea to
enable railroad trains to round curves by allowing the outer wheel to
ride upon its flange, the inner wheel riding upon its tread of smaller
diameter. With such a device it is desirable to have the flange of the
inner wheel travel in a groove in the rail to prevent the car from slid-
ing off the tracks sideways. This fact was alluded to in the original
and described in the reissue. The other change in the reissue consisted
in the omission of certain uses for which, it had apparently been found,
the invention was not adapted. The defendant maintained that it had
a right to continue to use its equipment because it was constructed before
the reissue application.
The Court was forced to pass upon an important preliminary question
as to whether Congress had the power to permit an inventor by reissue
to compel the discontinuance of the use of an invention although that
use had been lawfully begun prior to the reissue. The Court based its
answer in the affirmative upon Evans v. Jordan."° That case involved
a statute giving Evans a renewal of his patent after the original had
expired. During the interval, while the invention was not protected,
Jordan had constructed his machine, but it was held that the grant of
the renewal enabled Evans to stop Jordan's use of it. The statute, as
interpreted by the Court, seems to have been a clear abuse of the power
of government; whether or not invalid under the Fifth Amendment,
the interpretation, with its injury to the innocent intervenor, should
have been avoided at all costs. Under the rule of *the Evans case, Con-
gress would apparently have the power today to grant a renewal of the
original Bell patent to the heirs of Mr. Bell, and so to strangle the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company together with all of its competi-
tors and in effect to confiscate their property.
The carrying over of the Evans v. Jordan principle into reissue law,
however, is still more vicious. An extended patent (renewal) can only
be obtained by an act of Congress and the practice of granting such
19. 4 How. 380 (U. S. 1846).
20. 9 Cr. 199 (U. S. 1815).
1934]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
extensions has been discontinued; but reissues are terrifyingly numer-
ous and the possibility that patents may be reissued is a continuing
threat to every business concern.
The Stimpson case had been decided by the lower court in favor of
the Railroad Company. The trial judge had confidently announced a
doctrine of intervening rights, charging the jury in part as follows:
"It clearly appears that the defendants constructed their railroad with the
plaintiff's curves in 1834, one year or more before the plaintiff's application
for his renewed patent; consequently, they may continue its use without lia-
bility to the plaintiff."21
But the judgment for the defendant was reversed by the Supreme Court
on the ground that the Act of 1832, under which the reissue had been
granted, expressly excluded the proffered defense; and the Court went
on to say that in this respect the Act of 1836 "made no material change
in the act of 1832."22 The Court left no doubt as to its attitude toward
the proposed doctrine of intervening rights:
"Now it is plain that no prior use of the defective patent can authorize the use
of the invention after the emanation of the renewed patent under the above
section . . . Now any person using an invention protected by a renewed
patent subsequently to the date of this act is guilty of an infringement, how-
ever long he may have used the same after the date of the defective and sur-
rendered patent.12
3
A consideration of the claims of the reissue and the claims of the
original patent, however, shows that in every proper sense they covered
the same invention within the same scope, so that the operations of the
defendant infringed the original patent as well as the reissue. It appears,
therefore, that the question of intervening rights did not really come
before the Court. The Stimpson case is more nearly in line with the
case of Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin,24 where a somewhat simi-
lar discussion of intervening rights occurs, but in which the whole founda-
tion of the doctrine or of the denial of the doctrine is lacking for the rea-
son that the defendant's operation infringed the original patent as well
as the reissue.
From the Stimpson decision until 1882, few attorneys had the temerity
to present the defense of intervening rights; and, whenever presented, it
was peremptorily denied." The holding of the Supreme Court in
21. Supra note 19, at 402.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 402-403.
24. 245 U. S. 198 (1917).
25. Battin v. Taggert, 17 How. 74, 84 (U. S. 1854); Agawam Company v. Jordan,
7 Wall. 583, 609 (U. S. 1869); Goodyear v. Day, Fed. Cas. No. 5,566 (C. C. D. N. J.
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Battin v. Taggert, 6 in 1854, is typical; and, insofar as it dealt with
intervening rights, may be summarized in the Court's statement (quoting
the Stimpson case) that:
"Where a defective patent had been surrendered, and a new one taken out,
and the patentee brought an action for a violation of his patent right . . .
proof of the use of the thing patented, during the interval between the original
and renewed patents, will not defeat the action. '27 .
The Rights of the Public: The Doctrine of Laches
In 1882, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Miller v. Brass
Co., 2 without citing a case, 29 announced a doctrine which, although
itself little more than a makeshift, was to have far reaching conse-
quences. Briefly, the doctrine was that a broadened reissue is invalid
if applied for after the expiration of an unreasonable length of time
from the grant of the original patent. Fifteen years had elapsed in the
Miller case between the grant of the original and the application for
the broadened reissue on which suit was brought. In the opinion of
the Court the reissue was not for the same invention that had been
described in the original, and the dismissal might have been affirmed
on that ground without further comment. But the Court went on to
"another grave objection"-that there had been no inadvertence or mis-
take in the original. "The pretense in this case that there was an
inadvertence and oversight which had escaped the notice of the patentee
for fifteen years is too bald for human credence." The error, if any,
"was obvious on the first inspection of the patent."30
Again the Court might have affirmed without further discussion.
But no,
"If two years' public enjoyment of an invention with the consent and allow-
ance of the inventor is evidence of abandonment, and a bar to an application
for a patent, a public disclaimer in the patent itself should be construed
1852); Carr v. Rice, 1 Fisher's Patent Cases 189, 211 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1856). Cf. Howe
v. Williams, 2 Clifford 245, 261, 262 (C. C. D. Mass. 1863).
26. Supra note 25.
27. Id. at 84.
28. 104 U. S. 350 (1882).
29. The defense of laches by mere passage of time had been expressly denied in Hussey v.
Bradley, 5 Blatch. 134, 148 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1863). Generally the question had not
even been considered, court and counsel having tacitly assumed that the mere passage
of time did not make a reissue invalid. Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. 212 (U. S. 1853);
Agawam Company v. Jordan, supra note 25; Smith v. Pearce, 2 McLean 176 (C. C. D.
Ohio 1840); Allen v. Blunt, 2 Wood. & M. 121 (C. C. D. Mass. 1846). Here, as else-
where, citations are intended to be representative rather than exhaustive.
30. Supra note 28, at 352.
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equally favorable to the public. Nothing but a clear mistake, or inadvertence,
and a speedy application for its correction, is admissible when it is sought
merely to enlarge the claim."
3' 1
The Court explained that broadened reissues, enlarging the claims of
the original, were not in the congressional mind when the reissued statute
was passed, although
"By a curious misapplication of the law it has come to be principally resorted
to for the purpose of enlarging and expanding patent claims. And the evils
which have grown from the practice have assumed large proportions. Patents
have been so expanded and idealized, years after their first issue, that hun-
dreds and thousands of mechanics and manufacturers, who had just reason to
suppose that the field of action was open, have been obliged to discontinue
their employments, or to pay an enormous tax for continuing them."
'32
One of the chief objections, then, that the Court makes to a broad-
ened reissue granted long after the original patent, is based upon the
possibility of certain intervening acts by persons other than the patentee.
"It will not do for the patentee to wait until other inventors have produced
new forms of improvement, and then, with the new light thus acquired, under
pretense of inadvertence and mistake, apply for such an enlargement of his
claim as to make it embrace these new forms. Such a process of expansion
carried on indefinitely, without regard to lapse of time, would operate most
unjustly against the public . .. 33
Although historically the doctrine of intervening rights sprang from
the doctrine of laches, it clearly appears from the above passages that
the sentiment of intervening rights, and the evil at which the doctrine
of intervening rights directly aims, played a large part in inspiring
the doctrine of laches; and that that evil, the injury to innocent inter-
venors, represents the primary injustice involved in broadened reissues.
The Court could easily have avoided discussion of laches and inter-
vening rights if it had so chosen; the fact that it went out of its way
to enunciate the new doctrine, which, as it seems, fairly burst through
a wall of neutral facts, indicates that the recognition of intervening
rights-and its spiritual offshoot (although chronological antecedent),
the doctrine of laches-rests upon a fundamental and undeniable de-
mand of justice and equity.
In the years immediately following the Miller case, a large number
of reissues came before the Supreme Court. In all of those which in-
volved substantial broadening, the Court refused to sustain the reissue.
The case of James v. Campbell3 deserves special comment. In it the
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 354-355.
33. Id. at 355.
34. 104 U. S. 356 (1882).
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Court held a reissue invalid on the ground that if the original patent was
clear and there was no real mistake, a reissue could not be had for the
purpose of expanding and generalizing the claim. This is a holding to
the effect that a reissue which substantially changes the scope of an
unambiguous patent has no justification. Here, in a decision handed
down on the same day as the Miller case, is the birth of a doctrine of
departure from the original invention which has not yet perhaps re-
ceived its proper recognition.
The Court, however, gradually shifted from the position that a
broadened reissue was for a different invention than the original to one
of laying emphasis upon the length of delay before application for the
reissue. In 1884, in Mahn v. Harwood,3 5 the doctrine of laches in
broadened reissues crystallized from dictum to stare decisis, and the
suggested analogy to the rule of public use supplied the term of two
years as the normal measure of laches. From that year, courts and
Patent Office alike have always accepted the rule that a lapse of more
than two years30 between the grant of an original patent and the applica-
tion for a broadened reissue3l will invalidate the reissued patent unless
the delay is excused by special circumstances; 38 although, to be sure,
35. 112 U. S. 354 (1884).
36. The case of Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156 (1892), is clear that the doctrine of
laches does not affect the validity of promptly-applied-for broadened reissues. Summariz-
ing sixteen cases, the Court observed: "From this summary of the authorities it may
be regarded as the settled rule of this court that the power to reissue may be exercised
when the patent is inoperative by reason of the fact that the specification as originally
drawn was defective or insufficient, or the claims were narrower than the actual invention
of .the patentee, provided the error has arisen from inadvertence or mistake, and the
patentee is guilty of no fraud or deception." Id. at 170 (italics added).
37. Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in the Miller case, supra note 28, was based very
definitely on a recognition of the abuses involved in broadened reissues; and he said, with
respect to other reissues: "The correction of a patent by means of a reissue, where it is
invalid or inoperative for want of a full and clear description of the invention, cannot
be attended with such injurious results as follow from the enlargement of the claim. And
hence a reissue may be proper in such cases, though a longer period has elapsed since the
issue of the original patent." Supra note 28, at 355-356.
38. When the Commissioner of Patents refuses to grant a reissue for want of unusual
circumstances which excuse the delay, his decision is almost certain to be affirmed. Applica-
tion of Schneider, 262 Fed. 718 (App. D. C. 1920) (delay of 2 years and 8 months; appel-
lant said "he had no occasion to review his patent until the present time"); In re Lees,
269 Fed. 679 (App. D. C. 1920) (delay of 2 years and 5 months; appellant unskilled in
patent matters, relied upon solicitor, and only recently discovered the deficiency in the
original); In re Holland, 270 Fed. 704 (App. D. C. 1921); In re Mummert, 278 Fed. 399
(App. D. C. 1922) (delay of 3/ years; ill health, death of husband, absence of son in
military service); Application of Parks, 16 F. (2d) 541 (App. D. C. 1926) (delay of 3V
years; change of attorneys, financial difficulties in business ventures, lack of time); In re
Markel, 17 F. (2d) 685 (App. D. C. 1927) (delay of almost 5 years; employment by U. S.
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their failure to distinguish broadened reissues in all cases prevents one
from predicting with certainty the outcome of a particular case.
The language of the Court in Topliff v. Topli1ff indicates the frequent
use of the doctrine of laches and gives a hint of the doctrine of inter-
vening rights (which was, in spite of the words of the Court, still in
embryo):
"In the large number of cases which have come up to this court since that of
Mahn v. Harwood was decided, in which reissues have been held to be invalid,
it will be found that the opinion of the court was put "upon the ground, either
that the patentee had been guilty of inexcusable laches, usually of from four
to sixteen years, or that circumstances had occurred since the granting of the
original patent which made the reissue operate harshly or unjustly to the
defendant in the case." 40
Accepting the two-year rule, the Court affirmed the validity of a broad-
ened reissue applied for within that period, although granted many years
later.
But this two-year rule propounded by the Court rests upon a false
analogy. The Patent Act of 1793 provided that a patent could not be
granted if the invention was in use before the application for patent."
This provision worked great hardship upon the inventor because tc
make certain that his device was operative and commercially useful, it
was frequently necessary to put it to use. The law was therefore changed
in 1839 to provide a period of two years within which he might apply
for a patent after the device went into public use. 2 Now this period
government as locomotive inspector). See also Ives v. Sargent, 119 U. S. 652 (1887);
Hartshorn v. Saginaw Barrel Co., 119 U. S. 664 (1887).
When the Commissioner of Patents grants a broadened reissue after a delay of more
than two years before the application for reissue, the courts find special circumstances to
excuse the delay frequently enough to make it impossible for a third person to determine,
in advance of an adjudication, whether or not a broadened reissue granted after such delay
is in truth invalid. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp. v. Clark Bros. Co., 17 F. (2d)
189 (W. D. N. Y. 1927) (delay of 3% years from March, 1912; assignor of patent, a Ger-
man citizen, presumably was unfamiliar with our patent laws and believed that the original
accurately claimed his invention; negotiations for the assignment were delayed by the
World War until February, 1915); Gross v. Norris, 18 F. (2d) 418 (D. Md. 1927) (delay
of 2 years and 7 months; an appeal, ultimately successful, from a decision declaring the
original invalid, was pending at the end of the second year). But cf. Boland v. Thompson,
Z6 Fed. 633 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886).
Even a reissued patent applied for within two years of the original grant, and subse-
quently granted, may be held invalid if the delay was unreasonable. H. W. Roos Co. v.
McMiilan, 64 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933), cert. den., 54 Sup. Ct. 121 (1933).
39. Supra note 36.
40. Id. at 169.
41. 1 STAT. 318 (1793).
42. 5 STAT. 353 (1839).
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of two years for study, development, and commercial exploitation was
probably intended in large part to enable the inventor to get the true
grasp of his invention. There is, therefore, no justification whatever
for the grant of another period of two years for further exploitation
and further development unless it is deliberately intended to permit
the reissue to include new inventions made after the grant of the origi-
nal patent.
Moreover, at the time provision was made in the statute for the two-
year period, the grant of a patent almost as soon as the application was
filed gave the inventor little opportunity to revise his application
after it was first drafted. The reissue statute was provided to give
him a second chance at his specification. In contrast to this situation,
the inventor at the present time has for the proper visualization of his
specification not only the preliminary two years before which he must
file an application but also from one to six years while his application
is being examined, criticized, and molded by the give and take between
the attorney and the Patent Office experts. There appears to be little
justification, therefore, for the addition of two more years.
Thus, while the doctrine of laches attacks the injustice involved in
broadened reissues, it does so upon an illogical foundation, with the result
that it stops at an arbitrary point and leaves part of the injustice alto-
gether untouched.
The Rights of the Public: The Doctrine of Intervening Rights
Mr. Justice Bradley, by his language in the Miller case, had impreg-
nated the federal judiciary with the seed of a doctrine which, after an
interim of thirty-five years, took definite form in the decision of Judge
Augustus N. Hand in Ashley v. Samuel C. Tatum Co.43  There had
previously been indications of the embryonic formulation of the doctrine.
Continually, in cases where no question of interVening rights required
decision, courts had expressed sympathy for any persons who, having
entered upon an unimpeachable course of action prior to the plaintiff's
application for a broadened reissue, might be obliged because of that
reissue to forego that course of action and thereby to suffer a loss.4
43. 240 Fed. 979 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
44. Miller v. Brass Company, supra note 28, at 355; White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S.
47, 62 (1886); Topliff v. Topliff, supra note 36, at 165, 171; Carpenter Straw-Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Searle, 60 Fed. 82, 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894); Autopiano Co. v. American
Player Action Co., 222 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum
Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845, 851 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901); American Automotoneer Co. v.
Porter, 232 Fed. 456, 462, 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Hudnut v. Lafayette Hominy Mills,
26 Fed. 636, 637 (C. C. D. Ind. 1886); Wooster v. Handy, 21 Fed. 51 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1884).
In Autopiano Co. v. American Player Action Co., supra, a first reissue, granted six years
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But always, where the court favored the alleged infringer, there were
other and better established grounds on which to rest the decision, gen-
erally unexcused delay of more than two years, or a divergence between
the invention described in the original and the invention sought to be
patented in the reissue. The emergence of the doctrine was not, how-
ever, without danger of miscarriage. In A. D. Howe Machinery Co. v.
Coffield Motor Washer Co." the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit flatly refused to adopt a doctrine of intervening rights to favor
respondents who, during the seven months that elapsed between the
original patent and the application for a broadened reissue, had built,
but had not yet marketed to any appreciable extent, some of the motors
which infringed the reissue without infringing the original patent.
In articulating the doctrine of intervening rights, Judge Hand, sitting
in New York, did not mention the Fourth Circuit decision. Over seven
years had elapsed between the original patent and the application for
the broadened reissue on which the complainant's suit in the Ashley case
was based, but special circumstances excused the delay, and the com-
plainant would have been entitled to a decree had it not been for the
defendant's intervening rights. Four years before the application for
a reissue the defendant took out a patent and began to manufacture and
sell inkstands under it. The defendant's inkstands infringed the reissue
patent but did not infringe the original patent. Judge Hand said:
"I can feel no doubt that a business of some importance has been built up
by the defendant between the dates of the granting of the original patent and
of the reissue, and that consequently intervening rights have arisen within
the legal acceptation of the term. Under these circumstances, complainants
cannot be allowed to claim 'infringement by this particular defendant in con-
tinuing the manufacture and sale which it entered upon while the... [original
patent] was the only public announcement of complainant's alleged monopoly.'
See Autopiano Co. v. American Player Action Co .... ,,40
The court expressly found the reissue patent valid, and undoubtedly
would have allowed the complainant to maintain a suit against an in-
fringer who had acquired no private intervening rights.
after the original patent, narrowed the claims, and a year later a second reissue restored
the claims, of the original. The defendant, sued for infringement, had begun the manu-
facturer and sale of his article (which infringed the second reissue, but not the first) between
the respective grants of the two reissues. The court tried to rest its decision against the
complainant on intervening rights; but the absence of inadvertence in the application for
the first reissue, reduces anything said about intervening rights to the status of dictum.
45. 197 Fed. 541 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912), cert. den., 227 U. S. 677(1913). See also, Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., supra note 44.
46. Supra note 43, at 982.
[Vol. 43
REISSUED PATENTS
Nine more years elapsed before the question again presented itself
in its pure form. In 1926 Judge Cochrane of the federal District Court
for Kentucky, in a long and carefully written opinion, awarded an injunc-
tion and an accounting to the owner of a broadened reissue patent which
had been applied for one year after the grant of the original patent.
The invention was a brick-making machine. The defendant, a competi-
tor brick maker, proposed in the interim to construct certain brick-
making machines, and, being correctly advised that the proposed ma-
chines would not infringe the plaintiff's patent, proceeded to construct
and to use two such machines and to advertise and sell the product. The
plaintiff then applied for a reissue, which covered the defendant's ma-
chines. Judge Cochran attempted to distinguish the Ashley case on
the ground that in it a seven years' delay was found excusable because of
special circumstances, and that perhaps
".... in such a case where such special circumstances are not known, to [sic]
a party, who, after the lapse of two years and before the making of the applica-
tion, enters upon the manufacture and sale of the articles which infringe the
reissue, acquires an intervening right and the reissue, though valid, is not
enforceable against him."1
48
The decree was reversed upon appeal in Ashland Fire Brick Co. v.
General Refractories Co.49  The defendant, it was held, had "at least"
a right to continue to manufacture bricks with the two machines which
it had used prior to the application for reissue. The court definitely
based its holding on the theory of a personal estoppel. To the argu-
ment that the statute gave notice of the patentee's right to reissue, and
that there could therefore be no estoppel, the court replied:
"This result might logically follow if there were any such general right to a
reissue within the maximum period; but there is not. The right to a reissue
is exceptional, and is possessed only by those who can come within the excep-
tions. It must affirmatively appear, not only that the state of the art per-
mitted a broader claim, but that the failure to get it was the result of inad-
vertence. There being no presumption that a patent can be reissued, and the
special cases where it may be done being relatively few, it does not seem that
47. General Refractories Co. v. Ashland Fire Brick Co., 15 F. (2d) 215 (E. D. Ky.
1926).
48. Id. at 230.
49. 27 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), cert. dismissed on petitioner's motion, 278
U. S. 662 (1928). Judge Cochran had not cited the Fourth Circuit case, although it was
the only one that might conceivably have been regarded as direct authority for his holding;
and the Circuit Court of Appeals returned the courtesy by failing to cite the Ashley case.
The almost consistent failure of courts, in dealing with the subject of intervening rights,
to evidence a thorough grasp of the authorities, makes it extraordinarily difficult to draw
consistent rules of law from the decisions.
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the public, acting on the faith of things as they are, should carry the burden
of a change it has no reason to expect. A competitor, observing that the patent
is limited to specific features which he does not care to use, may naturally
assume that the limitation was either intentional, or necessary, or both."' 0
The court, however, did
U... not overlook the difficulty which sometimes exists in finding all the
elements of a conventional estoppel. If, within the two-year period and before
the defendant, relying on the limitations in the original patent, has acted to his
prejudice (e.g., by building a non-infringing machine) the patentee had filed
his application for reissue, manifestly the defendant could not claim any inter-
vening right, although he acted upon the faith of the dedication in the original
patent, being without knowledge of the reissue application. This consideration
is not, we think, inconsistent with the finding of a true estoppel in a case where
the reissue application had not been filed thus early. The right to claim the
estoppel depends upon the dedication and its existence as a continuing offer
of immunity. By his reissue application, the patentee withdraws that offer, in
the only generally possible way. When the defendant acts, he knows that the
offer may have been withdrawn in this effective but nonpublic way, and he
takes his chances upon the existence of such a withdrawal. Lacking any legis-
lation, the loss must fall upon the later comer."5' 1
The conflict in the cases was recognized by the Supreme Court in
the recent case of Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co.: 2
"The extent of the operation of the estoppel creating intervening rights in
such a case presents a question not free from difficulty . . . The views of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals on the general subject of the scope of intervening
rights are not entirely easy to reconcile . . . The question, if it were really
before us, would be one sufficiently important therefore to justify our con-
sideration of it on certiorari."
53
This would indicate that the Court regards the question of intervening
rights as an open one, despite its century-old statements apparently to
the contrary, and it is submitted that in view of the liberal tendencies
of the Court as now constituted it will probably recognize intervening
rights if the question comes before it. 4
50. Id. at 746.
51. Ibid.
52. 264 U. S. 314 (1924).
53. Id. at 317-318.
54. On the question of intervening rights in non-broadened reissues it is impossible to
ascertain whether or not there exists a direct Supreme Court pronouncement. In Aber-
crombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, supra note 24, the plaintiffs brought suit upon a reissue
patent for which application had been made seven years after the grant of the original
patent. Briefly, the original had claimed a combination, in a described lamp, of a certain
water tube and stirring rod with a bent end; the drawings and description likewise re-
ferred to a bent rod. The Seventh Circuit had held that a combination with a straight
[Vol. 43
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Analysis of the Doctrine of Intervening Rights
The General Refractories case and the Ashley case alone rest un-
equivocally on the doctrine of intervening rights. It is proposed there-
fore to take them as the basis of analysis.
rod did not infringe the patent. Bleser v. Baldwin, 199 Fed. 133 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
The reissue, accordingly, covered the combination with the rod whether bent or straight;
but the Third Circuit held it invalid on the ground that "a reissue cannot be allowed to
broaden the original patent . . ., especially after such a lapse of time as seven years, and
after the claim had been limited by a final adjudication." Grier Brothers Co. v. Baldwin,
219 Fed. 735, 739 (C. C. A. 3d, 1915). The suit that finally reached the Supreme Court
began in the Second Circuit. Baldwin v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 227 Fed. 455 (S. D.
N. Y. 1915), aff'd, 228 Fed. 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915). There the Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the Seventh Circuit had erred in holding that the original did not cover a
combination with a straight rod, and that the Third Circuit was therefore wrong in hold-
ing that the reissue broadened the original. "The straight rod idea," said the Second Cir-
cuit, "was an alternative form, which the patentee was entitled to use instead of a rod
with a bent form." 228 Fed. at 900. The Supreme Court affirmed a decree for the plain-
tiff, and for the same reason. The Court believed "that the original patent did not need
the exposition of the reissue. It exhibited an invention . . . entitled to invoke the doctrine
of equivalents . . . Whether the rod was bent or made straight was unimportant." Supra
note 24, at 207-208. Of course, then, although one of the defendants had begun to manu-
facture the infringing lamp before the application for reissue, no question of intervening
rights could arise; for the reissues did not alter the substance of the original. If the de-
fendant's lamp infringed the reissue, it must also have infringed the original patent before
the application for reissue, and the reissue has, therefore, not altered the defendant's posi-
tion. See Krauth v. Autographic Register Co., 285 Fed. 199, 205 (D. N. J. 1921), rev'd on
other grounds, Autographic Register Co. v. Diesbach, 286 Fed. 470 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
The Circuit Court of Appeals therefore had not gone into the question. The District
Court had ventured a few aimless words on the matter, without citation of authority.
Neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court seemed to understand that their gen-
eral holding in the case dismissed the question altogether. They presented their argument
on intervening rights as if it were intrinsically necessary to the decision. The Supreme
Court, quoting the District Court in full, said: "To the contention that the Justrite
Company, the manufacturing defendant, acquired rights before the reissue, we again may
oppose the reasoning and conclusion of District judge Mayer and their affirmance by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. The learned judge said: 'It will be remembered that this
company entered the field with its lamp at a time when the validity and scope of the
Baldwin patent were still unquestioned and when after some five years of capable effort,
the Baldwin lamp had created an extensive market. The Justrite Company took its chances
and, in view of the necessities of the situation, it is relieved of all accountability for the
period prior to the granting of the reissue patent; but when the reissue was granted, the
Justrite Company again took its chances.
"'By the reissuance of the patent, the patentee loses all in the way of an accounting
under the original patent, but the dominant purpose of the reissue statute was to save
to the inventor the future remaining after the reissue.
"'I see nothing in the course of plaintiffs or defendants which would allow a court of
equity to conclude that defendants are to be relieved because of intervening rights.'"
Supra note 24, at 209-210.
Taken by itself, this passage may be regarded as an answer to the defense of interven-
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(1) The court in the General Refractories case,' 5 like the court in the
Ashley case, 56 not only rests its decision on the ground of personal es-
toppel, but expressly rejects mere intervening public use as a defense.
The defendant must himself have used the invention which the subse-
quently-applied-for reissue covered and which the original patent failed
to protect, or must himself have performed whatever other intervening
acts constitute the defense. But the limitation of the doctrine to such a
defendant is merely a dictum, and must be weighed against dicta favoring
the defense of intervening public use.
It may be questioned whether the personal estoppel theory of these
cases is tenable. There are two arguments against it, one merely damag-
ing in effect, the other totally destructive. To begin with the former,
it is generally conceded that if the intervening acts began after the
plaintiff's application for a reissue, although before the grant of the re-
issued patent, there is no defense;" 7 in other words, after making a pub-
lic deception, sufficient to create an estoppel in favor of anyone who acts
upon it, the patentee may avoid any further estoppel by a secret act,
which does not correct the public deception. A curious sort of estoppel!
In all logic there should at least be included in the protection of the
estoppel all persons who act before the reissued patent is granted; al-
though the contrary seems to be generally conceded, there is no decision
on the point.
ing rights in cases of non-broadened issues, that one who, before the application for
reissue, uses the invention which the reissue, but not the original, protects, simply "takes
his chances." The words of the District Court, sanctioned by the Supreme Court, have
been referred to in reply to the defense of intervening rights in cases both of broadened
and of non-broadened reissues. Frick Co. v. Lindsay, 27 F. (2d) 59, 63 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928) ; General Refractories Co. v. Ashland Fire Brick, supra note 47, at 226, 227; Vortex
Manufacturing Co. v. F. N. Burt Co., 297 Fed. 513, 517 (W. D. N. Y. 1924). And, al-
though the weight of authority in cases of broadened reissues favors intervening rights,
the weight of what little authority can be found opposes the defense where non-broadened
reissues are involved. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Springfield Boiler Co., 16 F. (2d) 964
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Hawie Manufacturing Co. v. Hatheway Manufacturing Co., 27 F.
(2d) 937 (D. Conn. 1928); Albertson & Co. v. Beckley-Ralston Co., 258 Fed. 453 (N. D.
IlI. 1919); Steiner & Voegtly Hardware Co. v. Tabor Sash Co., 178 Fed. 831 (C. C.
D. N. J. 1910); cf. Vortex Manufacturing Co. v. F. N. Burt Co., supra. For a case seem-
ingly contra, although it is not clear whether the decision rests on laches or on intervening
rights, see Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. Mitchell, 269 Fde. 261 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
55. "In approving and adopting the theory of estoppel to support a private intervening
right in the nature of a license as against a generally valid reissue, we do not overlook
the difficulty which sometimes exists in finding all the elements of a conventional estoppel."
Supra note 49, at 746. (italics added).
56. "While, therefore, the reissue patent is valid and infringed, this suit cannot be
maintained against this particular defendant . . ." Supra note 43, at 982. (italics added).
57. Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., supra note 49, at 746; H. W.
Roos Co. v. McMillan, supra note 38, at 569.
[Vol. 43
REISSUED PATENTS
But an argument from the statute itself completely destroys the possi-
bility of a personal estoppel. If the patentee inadvertently failed to
claim in full his invention or inventions, so the statute provides, he may
apply for a reissue, and the reissue will be valid as of the date of the
original patent.5 The potential infringer has notice of the statute.
He knows that if the patentee was inadvertent he may later lay claim to
anything which by his inadvertence was omitted, provided only that the
patent grant somewhere suggests the omitted matter.59 The court in
the General Refractories case replied that there is "no presumption that
a patent can be reissued."6 0 It is difficult to see what force lies in that
undoubted truth; for, presumption or no presumption, the right to apply
for a retroactive reissue is given by the statute, and the infringer is
therefore charged with notice of it. Unless the original patent be re-
garded as an actual, positive assertion by the patentee that he has made
no inadvertent error in his application-and only the most excessive
contractualism could drive one so to regard it,--there is no basis for a
personal estoppel.
In a case6 in which there had been four years of unexcused delay
before the application for a broadened reissue, and in which expensive
experiments (to develop the device which the reissue sought to cover)
by persons not involved in the litigation had intervened, Judge Learned
Hand vigorously advanced a number of arguments against the theory
of personal estoppel, and concluded that no personal estoppel was nec-
essary to a decision for the defendants in the case at bar. Indeed, in
view of the long delay, not even intervening public acts need have been
proved.
That dictum is therefore weak as an authority; but with regard to the
evils to be cured, its soundness is manifest. The first of these-the
granting of reissues to secure additional inventions which the patentee
never invented-will surely be more completely extirpated by the broader
doctrine of intervening rights which permits any person to take advan-
tage of any other person's intervening acts as a defense. The curious
situation in which competitors will find themselves if courts follow
the narrower doctrine is apparent. Competitor A, who began to use the
invention just before it was claimed in (or, by the language of the courts,
58. In the words of the statute, the reissue "shall have the same effect and operation
in law, on the trial of all actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same had been
originally filed in such corrected form .. ." Note 8, supra.
59. Note 4, supra.
60. Supra note 49, at 746.
61. Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 47 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
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just before the application for) a reissue, may continue to use it, but
competitor B, who began a few weeks later, cannot use it at all; as a
result, if the invention is very valuable, A may be able to drive B out
of business. Surely this would give A, who had no legal monopoly what-
ever, an unfair advantage.
The practical results of the respective doctrines, as well as the evils
to be cured, demand that the defense of intervening rights, or, as it
might better be called, the defense of intervening use, be available to
everyone and not merely to the intervening user-in short, that it com-
pletely invalidate the broadened features of the reissued patent. 
0 2
(2) The question arises as to whether it is necessary to the defense
of intervening rights that the defendant (or other intervenor) shall
have relied upon the patentee's failure to cover his "invention" in the
original patent. Although the opinion in the Ashley case does not re-
veal that the defendant did so rely, the General Refractories decision
expressly rests on the fact that
".... after the issue of the original patent and with knowledge of it and expressly
appreciating its limited character, indeed, being governed therein by the advice
of patent counsel, the defendant built a noninfringing brick machine, and still
before the reissue application another one, at a substantial expense, and put
them into commercial use on a large scale by extensively selling their product,
and thus made them substantially material to its manufacturing business . .. ,3
If the ground of personal estoppel applies, such reliance would of course
be necessary (and it would have to be by the defendant himself). But
by the better view, as has been seen, personal estoppel is not a sound
62. The need for such invalidation has not gone unnoticed. On March 15, 1933, Repre-
sentative Joseph A. Gavagan of New York introduced the following bill to amend the
reissue statute: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4916 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. C.,
title 35, sec. 64) be amended by adding at the end thereof the following: 'But such a
reissued patent shall have no effect other than the effect of said original patent, against
any act, or acts, indicated or begun in good faith prior to the issuance of said reissued
patent; and it shall be sufficient for a person sued for infringement of the reissued patent
to prove such intervening act, or acts, of himself or another.'" H. R. 3526, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933). The same bill had been introduced during the previous Congress and
had been favorably reported out of Committee. H. R. REP. No. 1421, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1931) Ser. No. 9493.
It is submitted that the following amendment to the reissue statute would secure with
greater certainty and unambiguity the ends apparently sought by the framers of the above
bill: "Provided that in the event that any device, composition, process, or any other
embodiment or form of an invention, within the scope of any claim of the reissued patent
but not within the scope of the claims of the original patent, shall have been in public
use or on sale in this country prior to the grant of such reissued patent, such reissued
patent shall be void as to said claim.'
63. Supra note 49, at 746.
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basis of intervening rights; and if attention is directed primarily at the
evils to be cured, the necessity of reliance disappears.
Further, there is a subtle sort of reliance, generally present in cases
where no direct reliance appears, which cannot be proved in court.
Persons sufficiently educated to invent a device in a given field, or inter-
ested in manufacturing a certain device, generally have a pretty fair
understanding of the state of the art in the field,--an understand-
ing based partly upon familiarity with other devices, but chiefly upon
the problems which are being discussed and written about, the improve-
ments for which manufacturers cry, and the general literature on the
subject. A patent claiming a useful new invention in the field would,
in all probability, force its way into and considerably change this body
of information. The very fact that the original patent failed to claim
the invention, then, may well have misled the entire art and have indi-
rectly led the defendant, or other intervenor, to perform the intervening
acts, even though he never saw the patent. It does not appear, therefore,
that the doctrine can properly depend upon tie proof of conscious
reliance by the intervenor on the original patent.
(3) A further question of importance is that of the extent to which the
defendant, or other intervenor, need go in order to establish the defense
of intervening rights, and the acts he must perform. In the General
Refractories case the defendant built machines "at a substantial expense,"
made bricks with them, and extensively sold the bricks. In the Ashley
case the defendant took out a patent and made and sold inkstands under
it. In each case the intervening use had become an integral part of the
defendant's business. The Howe Machinery case, in which no inter-
vening rights were found to exist, may conceivably be distinguished on
the ground that it was not there proved that the infringing article "was
in any substantial sense put upon the market before complainant applied
for its reissue,"6 although the general tenor of the opinion is contrary
to the doctrine of intervening rights.
The fact that he has sold only a small number of the articles, does
not adversely affect a defendant's intervening rights.65 On the other
hand, the mere taking out of patents for which application was made
prior to the issuance of the plaintiff's original patent, will not create
intervening rights; 66 but if the defendant's invention is made after the
issue of the plaintiff's original patent, an intervening patent covering the
defendant's invention may be sufficient.6" No definitive rule can be
64. Supra note 45, at 547.
65. Autopiano Co. v. American Player Action Co., supra note 44.
66. American Automotoneer Co. v. Porter, supra note 44.
67. Id. at 463.
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drawn from the adjudicated cases, but in general it may be said that in
jurisdictions where intervening rights are recognized any clear loss"3
which the intervenor will sustain as a result of the enforcement of the
reissue will suffice as a basis for such rights.
The nature of the problems raised by broadened patents and the emerg-
ing doctrine of intervening rights would indicate that a mere study of the
decisions is not sufficient. Even were they more in accord, the broader
aspects of the question would invite inquiry. "When studied with any
degree of thoroughness," said the late Professor Babbitt, "the economic
problem will be found to run into the political problem, the political
problem in turn into the philosophical problem, and the philosophical
problem itself to be almost indissolubly bound up at last with the reli-
gious problem.' 69  The religious phase of the problem, if it has one, is
not within the scope of this article, but a study of the legal phase will
be of little value unless we are prepared to reach down to its economic
and philosophic foundation.7" Judicial authorities have paid lip service
to legal technique while doing violence to legal principles and to human
justice. To resolve the problem adequately it is necessary in the last
analysis to go beyond legal technique and to lay bare, on the one hand,
the practical considerations and, on the other hand, the philosophic prin-
ciples which favor one side or the other. 1
68. It has been held that the mere production of articles where no "substantial invest-
ment" is involved will not constitute intervening rights. Naivette v. Bishinger, 61 F. (2d)
433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
69. BABBIT, DmocRAcy Aim LEADEzsEmr (1929) 1.
70. At one time writers on patent law were more ready than now to recognize the
philosophic aspect of their subject. Cf. CHE A I, Lzs BRrvars D'iNvENTiON (1878) 44:
"... que seraient les lois dont serait absent ce qu'on nomme la mtaphysique, c'est-A-dire
le recours aux principes? Si le lgislateur ne consent pas A etre metiphysiden dans ce
sens, il est sujet 5 faire de mauvaise besogne."
71. In the light of the broad economic and philosophic significance of such a problem,
it seems unfortunate that the bar in general has lost interest in patent law, and that patent
law has become more and more a thing apart. There are two apparent causes of this
phenomenon: the increasing complexity of mechanical invention and the centralization
of the business of manufacturing. Large manufacturing enterprises are the source of the
most lucrative reward for the honest patent lawyer, but in return they demand a narrow-
ing of the attorney's activities. Some companies have even offered free legal tuition to their
laboratory specialists, with a view to transforming them into patent attorneys to deal
with their respective specialties. As a result patent lawyers have become a distinct class
in themselves, and their brothers have learned to regard their work with the awe properly
felt in the presence of unapproachable mystery.
For patent law as a whole the result has naturally been unhappy. The freshness of
criticism which the bar at large always brings to a live problem has been replaced by the




Although the courts have developed weapons with which to combat
the evils inherent in broadened reissues, the question remains whether
these weapons are adequate. The first weapon-the simple holding that
the original patentee did not invent the invention claimed in the reissue
-would be adequate did the courts feel free to use it liberally; but the
Patent Office has in each case already found, ostensibly, that the patentee
is justified, and there is a presumption that the Patent Office did not err.
The difficulty here lies in the fact that in the ex parte proceeding before
the Patent Office that body has no adequate means of testing the tech-
nical facts, but in general must accept the state of facts presented by
the applicant; whereas in the courts all the technical evidence necessary
may be introduced by the opposing party. To regard the holding of the
Patent Office as presumptively correct is, therefore, to give the patentee
an unfair advantage. Furthermore, the difficulty of proving, before a
court untrained in science and mechanics, that the patentee did not in-
vent what he has claimed, especially in view of the fact that the burden
rests upon the defendant, constitutes a stumbling block in the way of
the effective use of this most direct weapon.
The doctrine of laches, by its inherent limitation to a given number
of years, cannot possibly cover all of the cases in which abuses may
arise.
The doctrine of intervening rights goes more nearly to the heart of
the evil. The great harm in broadened reissues lies in their effect on
those who, prior to a reissue, have used and perhaps built businesses
around the invention in question. This harm, the strict application of
the doctrine will to a great degree eradicate. There are occasional cases,
however, where, although no one prior to the reissue has made any
tangible use of the invention, the patentee knows it has been conceived
and hastens to add it to the scope of his patent by reissue. In such
instances the first and not the second evil is present, and the only harm
will be to persons who would otherwise have used the invention in the
future without interference. The doctrine of intervening rights does
an established religious caste, they understand the relationship between their special pres-
tige and the maintenance of the status quo. It is difficult to account, for example, for
the dying out of the movement for a separate patent court, unless we take into considera-
tion the jealous conservatism of the patent bar. Many prominent patent lawyers, whose
mechanical and scientific understanding are now about commensurate with that of the
judges before whom they appear, would undoubtedly find themselves helpless before a
court learned in both law and the physical sciences. It would be interesting to speculate upon




not help them. Furthermore, if the doctrine is given the broad scope
which is here urged as desirable-that is, if it invalidates the reissue
and therefore serves as a defense for others than the intervening actor-
it may often be difficult for the defendant, when not himself the inter-
vening actor, to prove the intervening use.
Therefore, although the doctrine of intervening rights in its broad
form will come close to achieving the desired end, the complete and
technically correct remedy can come only through the abolition of
broadened reissues altogether. It is significant that whenever the Su-
preme Court has felt that relief was needed against a broadened reissue
it has not created a personal defense but has given relief by declaring
the broadened claims void. Yet the courts, though they have enunciated
the doctrine of intervening rights in complete independence of the legis-
lature, cannot go further and abolish broadened reissues altogether with-
out changing their long established interpretation of the reissue statute.
The final step in the curious history of broadened reissues must be taken
by the legislature itself.
Legislative abolition of broadened reissues would seem to be highly
desirable. But as has been observed, non-broadened reissues are sub-
ject, although to a lesser extent, to the same condemnation. There exists,
then, good reason to urge that all forms of patent reissue be abolished.
The advocate of the reissue statute may answer that consideration has
been given only to the point of view of the infringer and not to that
of the patentee. The inventor, by an innocent mistake, has failed to
claim what he meant to claim. But to the contention that he should not
be so severely penalized for so trivial an error, it may be replied that
even in the relatively rare case of 9 really innocent mistake, the results
of the error, as has been shown, may be far from trivial.
Nor ought there be ignored the policy in favor of putting an invention
into use. Almost every great system of patent law includes a compul-
sory licensing provision. That of the United States has no such require-
ment, 2 but permits the patentee to allow the patented invention to rot
for seventeen years on the shelf and so to paralyze inventive and mer-
cantile initiative. Surely this should not be furthered to the extent
of permitting the patentee to accomplish the same effect with respect
to an invention which he has not even patented.
It may be argued that this view ignores the primary purpose of the
Patent Law-to promote invention by offering reward to the prospective
72. As a result, manufacturers often acquire patents not to utilize them but simply




inventor. When he sees his fellow-inventor unable to reap benefit from
an apparently patented invention because of inadvertence, probably by
the solicitor, in the wording or substance of the patent, will he not choose
some other occupation?
The truth is, however, that the prospective inventor knows astonish-
ingly little about 'the business affairs of his fellow-inventors. He knows
only that there is a Patent Law, and that Bessemer and a number of
other inventors no whit superior to himself have made a fortune by
patenting their inventions. To be sure, he may have heard some other
inventor-patentee complain that his invention has been pirated, but
that chronic complaint is and will be forever heard, no matter what
form the law may take. In one way or another, even valid and proper
patents repeatedly fail to satisfy their respective owners; and the repeal
of the reissue statute affecting only patents otherwise inoperative, can
constitute no more than an additional drop in a well-filled bucket. If
there is any great force in the Patent Law to encourage invention, surely
the occasional mishap due to faulty letters patent will not seriously
affect it.
Again, the ultimate purpose of the Patent Law is not to promote in-
vention but to further the progress of science and the useful arts73 by
securing inventions for the use of the public; and one who by his faulty
wording interferes with public use of an invention, even if it be his own
invention, acts against that ultimate purpose.74
But further, can it be assumed that the proper carrying out of the
purposes of the Constitution demands that this peculiar right of reissue
be given to inventors at so great a public cost? Or has the time come
when the rights of the business world and the general public should
themselves enter more fully into consideration, even if the result re-
quires a revaluation of the protection which the Patent Law affords to
inventors? In a certain sense, the Patent Law is economically the re-
verse of individualistic, for it places the individual, in the matter of
reward for invention, under the protection of the state. Yet basically
the Patent Law goes hand in hand with the general attitude-at once
philosophic, economic and sociological-which for want of a better name
has been called "Individualism," for it assumes that the welfare of
society depends primarily upon the acts of the gifted individual.
This attitude we recognize as an integral part of the popular and
73. U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, ci. S.
74. And, of course, if the inventor gets a complete monopoly of everything he asks,
there is little reason to regard him as cheated because he did not ask for more. The very




literary philosophy, and, to a more limited extent, of the technical
philosophy, of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But
today, and especially in the field of discovery and invention," the anti-
individualistic attitude meets with full justification; modern thought rec-
ognizes that "when the state of a science and the social need reach a
certain point, a number of individuals are likely to solve the same prob-
lem."' The advance of physical science depends in only small part
upon the sporadic contribution of the occasional genius. An invention
is, in truth, not strictly the product of an individual but the summation
of the aggregate contributions, each perhaps minute in itself, of many
investigators. The incandescent lamp was invented by Grove, who used
a platinum filament. Moissant suggested that the best filament would
.be made of one of the eight high-melting-point metals, one of which is
tungsten, and undertook laborious research to determine the properties
of each of those metals. Many workers in the field developed the
chemistry involved, until finally Auer von Welsbach produced tungsten
lamps on a commercial scale. Before that time, however, there was so
much scientific literature on the subject that all of the other metals
had been eliminated, and commercial development of the process was
reduced to a mere matter of industrial and business organization. The
history of the tungsten filament is typical.77 The state of the pertinent
art reaches a point where the invention must soon be made. One inventor
perceives a twig protruding above the ground, another perceives another
twig; each pulls at his twig and finds it connects with the same root.
75. Liberal thinkers who have to some extent opposed the anti-individualistic tendency,
have generally preferred to support their opinions by reference to great men of literature,
statecraft, and religion, and have studiously avoided scientists. See JaMEs, THE WILL TO
BmELTvx (1912) 228 et seq. Cf. HocxNo, THE MEANING oF GOD IN Humm EXPERIENCE
(1912) 337. It is interesting that Bismarck, one of the great men listed by James, argued
strenuously against the patent system. RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE ABorIIoN Or PATETS
FOR INvENTIONs (1869) 185 et seq.
76. TXomAs, SOURCE BooK FOR SoCIAL ORIGINs (1909) Introduction 20, quoted in
HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO TEE STUDY OF SOCIOLOo (1919) 478, 479.
77. Cf. The Chicago and Northwestern Railyay Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 556
(1878): "Like almost all other inventions, that of double brakes came when, in the
progress of mechanical improvement, it was needed; and being sought by many minds, it is
not wonderful that it was developed in different and independent forms, all original, and
yet all bearing a somewhat general resemblance to each other. In such cases, if one
inventor precedes all the rest, and strikes out something which includes and underlies all
that they produce, he acquires a monopoly, and subjects them to tribute"
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The owner of the root is he who runs more quickly to the Patent
Office."8 Such being the nature of the inventive process, surely little
of the impulse to create would be lost by a repeal of the reissue statute.
78. Of course, one must not ignore the part that an occasional individual plays by
inventing a useful device an appreciable time before the advance of the pertinent science
would have reached it. But in such a person the urge to invent is probably so great
that if, instead of offering reward, our law condemned every successful inventor to ten
years of penal servitude, he would have invented with equal fire and with equal success.
The creative impulse lies deeper in human nature than the founders of our Patent Law
suspected. See WOODWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY (1921) 517.
